Detection Without Prevention
- SIEMs record after the fact
- DLP misses context outside the network path
- Guardrails are advisory, not enforceable
- Recovery costs dwarf detection value
Monitors browser, desktop, coding-agent, MCP and cloud actions. Before impact, holds the risky action, then redacts, approves, reroutes, downgrades or denies with proof.
Why It's Hard
Every existing control watches. This one holds. The difference is whether the harmful action happens or is reconstructed from logs afterwards.

A control that breaks workflow gets switched off. Redact, approve, reroute and downgrade sit between allow and deny so the control survives contact with people trying to do their jobs.
The Coverage
Uploads and pastes into consumer AI tools intercepted at the point of use, so the customer list never reaches the chat window rather than being discovered in a log review.
Commands from IDE and terminal agents evaluated before execution, because the destructive operation and the helpful refactor arrive through the same channel.
Tool invocations checked against the arguments they were actually given, so a read tool pointed at a credential path is stopped even though the tool itself is approved.
Changes to production infrastructure held for evaluation, so an agent with a valid role still cannot delete the database because its credentials permitted it.
01
Actions are watched where they happen, the browser upload, the desktop agent's file read, the coding agent's shell command, the MCP tool call, the cloud mutation, starting in monitor mode so the baseline is real traffic.
02
An action matching a risky pattern is held before it takes effect, which is the difference between preventing an exfiltration and writing it up afterwards.
03
The held action is evaluated on actor, resource, destination, arguments, privilege, business intent and policy, then redacted, approved, rerouted to a sandbox or approved model, downgraded to weaker credentials, or denied.
04
Each decision produces evidence of what did not happen, non-release of data, non-execution of the command, alongside coverage, latency and bypass metrics for the control itself.
Beyond Allow & Deny
Redact, approve, reroute and downgrade sit between allow and deny, so the control survives contact with people trying to do their jobs.
Sensitive fields stripped from an otherwise legitimate request, so the workflow completes without the data leaving.
Risky-but-plausible actions routed to a human with the full context of what was requested and why, rather than failing silently.
A request headed for an unapproved model or an unsafe environment is redirected to a sanctioned one, so the work continues inside policy instead of stopping at it.
The action proceeds with weaker privileges than the caller holds, which contains a compromised agent without re-architecting every workflow first.
Every other control watches. This one holds the action before it takes effect and evaluates whether it should, the difference between preventing an exfiltration and writing it up afterwards.
Business Outcomes
Prevented
The harmful action stopped before impact.
Usable
Four decisions between allow and deny.
Provable
Evidence of what did not happen.
Start in monitor mode on agreed browser, agent, MCP and cloud paths, then enable prevention on the ones that matter, with evidence on both sides of the switch.