Security of AIRuntime Control

Others log what happened.This one holds the action.

Monitors browser, desktop, coding-agent, MCP and cloud actions. Before impact, holds the risky action, then redacts, approves, reroutes, downgrades or denies with proof.

Why It's Hard

Logs Are Not A Prevention Layer

Every existing control watches. This one holds. The difference is whether the harmful action happens or is reconstructed from logs afterwards.

Detection Without Prevention

  • SIEMs record after the fact
  • DLP misses context outside the network path
  • Guardrails are advisory, not enforceable
  • Recovery costs dwarf detection value

Binary Controls Get Turned Off

  • Allow-or-deny breaks legitimate workflows
  • Users route around blocking policies
  • False positives erode trust in the control
  • Nothing sits between allow and deny

Coverage Is Fragmented

  • Browser AI has no cloud audit trail
  • Coding agents run in the IDE, off-network
  • MCP tools invoked outside SIEM visibility
  • No unified policy across channels

Your Control's Blast Radius Is Expensive

A control that breaks workflow gets switched off. Redact, approve, reroute and downgrade sit between allow and deny so the control survives contact with people trying to do their jobs.

The Coverage

Where the runtime holds.

Browser & Desktop AI

Uploads and pastes into consumer AI tools intercepted at the point of use, so the customer list never reaches the chat window rather than being discovered in a log review.

Coding Agents & CLI

Commands from IDE and terminal agents evaluated before execution, because the destructive operation and the helpful refactor arrive through the same channel.

MCP Tool Calls

Tool invocations checked against the arguments they were actually given, so a read tool pointed at a credential path is stopped even though the tool itself is approved.

Cloud Mutations

Changes to production infrastructure held for evaluation, so an agent with a valid role still cannot delete the database because its credentials permitted it.

How It Works

Observe, hold, decide, prove.

01

Observe

Actions are watched where they happen, the browser upload, the desktop agent's file read, the coding agent's shell command, the MCP tool call, the cloud mutation, starting in monitor mode so the baseline is real traffic.

02

Hold

An action matching a risky pattern is held before it takes effect, which is the difference between preventing an exfiltration and writing it up afterwards.

03

Decide

The held action is evaluated on actor, resource, destination, arguments, privilege, business intent and policy, then redacted, approved, rerouted to a sandbox or approved model, downgraded to weaker credentials, or denied.

04

Prove

Each decision produces evidence of what did not happen, non-release of data, non-execution of the command, alongside coverage, latency and bypass metrics for the control itself.

Beyond Allow & Deny

Between allow and deny.

Redact, approve, reroute and downgrade sit between allow and deny, so the control survives contact with people trying to do their jobs.

Redact

Sensitive fields stripped from an otherwise legitimate request, so the workflow completes without the data leaving.

Require Approval

Risky-but-plausible actions routed to a human with the full context of what was requested and why, rather than failing silently.

Reroute

A request headed for an unapproved model or an unsafe environment is redirected to a sanctioned one, so the work continues inside policy instead of stopping at it.

Downgrade

The action proceeds with weaker privileges than the caller holds, which contains a compromised agent without re-architecting every workflow first.

Not Another Log.The Action, Held.

Every other control watches. This one holds the action before it takes effect and evaluates whether it should, the difference between preventing an exfiltration and writing it up afterwards.

Business Outcomes

What runtime control changes.

Prevented

The harmful action stopped before impact.

Usable

Four decisions between allow and deny.

Provable

Evidence of what did not happen.

Stop the action, not the investigation.

Start in monitor mode on agreed browser, agent, MCP and cloud paths, then enable prevention on the ones that matter, with evidence on both sides of the switch.